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INTRODUCTION 
The article of Professor Barry Feld’s that provides the foundation for this 
special issue of the Nevada Law Journal—My Life in Crime: An Intellectual 
History of the Juvenile Court1—chronicles the transformation of the juvenile 
justice system over the course of the past five decades. Feld is certainly the 
right person to tell this story. He is perhaps the leading scholar in juvenile jus-
tice of his generation. And, probably more than any other scholar, his scholar-
ship has had a direct impact on juvenile court practice.2 He has been a prosecu-
tor, law professor, researcher, commission member, and scholar. He was 
among the most radical critics of juvenile justice for most of his career, loudly 
calling for its abolition when most advocates for children were too afraid of 
what might happen if juvenile court were abolished.3 
In this response to his article, I will tell a different—but closely related—
story. I will look at the transformation that Feld himself went through in his 
views of the juvenile justice system. This is a story that allows us to glean some 
important insights about the nature of the juvenile justice system and why it 
evolved in the ways it did. By looking at the juvenile court’s history through 
the lens of its foremost chronicler, we can see the extent to which the court has 
been shaped by judges’, lawyers’, legislators’, and scholars’ assumptions about 
adolescents and their families. 
                                                        
*  Fiorello LaGuardia Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. I 
gratefully acknowledge support from the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Fund 
at New York University School of Law. 
1  Barry C. Feld, My Life in Crime: An Intellectual History of the Juvenile Court, 17 NEV. 
L.J. 299 (2017). 
2  Columbia law professor Elizabeth Scott would certainly be included in this group. See 
generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Develop-
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997). 
3  See generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT (1999) [hereinafter BAD KIDS]; Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: 
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) [hereinafter Abolish the Juvenile Court]. 
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I.   THE PRE-GAULT ERA 
For two-thirds of the twentieth century, juvenile justice, the remarkable 
Progressive invention, was allowed to flourish as legislators and policymakers 
wished. The Progressives imagined a new way of attending to the needs of 
young people who got into trouble with the law. They envisioned and created a 
justice system unlike any that had come before it. This new system, focused on 
the needs of the young people, was incompatible with existing conceptions of 
formality, rules, and rights. Federal courts, and the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States in particular, gave juvenile justice a free ride. 
Juvenile justice differentiated from all other justice systems in two broad 
ways. First, courts were allowed to act without any procedural constraints. Un-
der the Progressive intervention, juveniles accused of being delinquent were 
brought before “courts” presided over by judges who possessed virtually un-
checked power to act as they saw fit. In most juvenile courtrooms, no lawyers 
appeared– neither prosecutors nor defense counsel. Probation officers or other 
court personnel filed the document that placed the matter on the court’s docket. 
Judges had full access to everything in the file that was written up about the ac-
cused, including the interview the child had with the probation officer, the po-
lice, and others, as well as social and other information that may have been ob-
tained from family members, teachers, or others in the community. Judges 
would read these files, interrogate the children before them, and fashion an or-
der in each case according to the judge’s sense of what was best for the child 
and for society. 
If the procedural freedom seemed broad, juvenile courts possessed even 
more discretion when it came to the dispositional phase of proceedings. Judges 
were entirely free to impose any sentence they preferred on any child, regard-
less of the act that brought them to court with only one limitation: the sentence 
ended when the child reached the age of majority, usually twenty-one years of 
age.4 Thus it was from the beginning of juvenile court until 1967. 
II.   THE GAULT CASE 
When Barry Feld was studying for his first semester exams in law school 
in December 1966, a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union was ar-
guing in the Supreme Court seeking to rein in the lawlessness of juvenile 
court.5 In the Supreme Court, Norman Dorsen, Gerald Gault’s lawyer, chal-
lenged Gault’s juvenile delinquency adjudication in an Arizona juvenile court.6 
So many unacceptable things happened in Gault’s case that Dorsen must have 
                                                        
4  See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 825 (1988). 
5  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
6  Id. at 3–4. 
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felt like he had been invited to a smorgasbord overflowing with amazing choic-
es. 
Gault never had a trial.7 Neither he nor his parents were even informed of 
the charges brought against him.8 For that matter, even years after the proceed-
ing, the judge was never quite sure what law Gault was supposed to have bro-
ken.9 No witness with personal knowledge of what Gault allegedly did was ever 
produced.10 The judge interrogated Gault without warning him of the conse-
quences of answering his questions.11 No record of the proceeding was ever 
made.12 To top everything off, the court sentenced Gault to serve up to six years 
in the Arizona training school.13 It never became very clear what crime Gault 
even could have been said to have committed. But the closest analogue the ju-
venile court judge was able to come up with was a petty misdemeanor that was 
punishable by a maximum term of two months for an adult.14 
Dorsen strategically chose to challenge Gault’s adjudication exclusively on 
procedural due process grounds. In his brief, he asked the Court to hold that the 
Constitution requires that juveniles be provided with at least six procedural pro-
tections: the rights to (1) notice, (2) counsel, (3) remain silent, (4) confrontation 
and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, (5) a recorded record of the pro-
ceedings, and (6) an appeal.15 Securing these rights for juveniles would revolu-
tionize juvenile court practice, as both Dorsen and the Justices of the Court un-
derstood. 
Progressives had a strongly negative view of how the procedural rules ap-
plied in criminal court. Criminal courts, the Progressives believed, were “re-
strained by antiquated procedure, saturated in an atmosphere of hostility, trying 
cases for determining guilt and inflicting punishment according to inflexible 
rules of law.”16 They were “limited by the outgrown custom and compelled to 
walk in the paths fixed by the law of the realm,” and dominated by “prosecu-
tors, and lawyers, trained in the old conception of law [who] stag[ed] dramati-
cally, but often amusingly, legal battles, as the necessary paraphernalia of a 
criminal court.”17 They sought to replace this by a process freed from the 
“primitive prejudice, hatred, and hostility toward the lawbreaker” that was om-
                                                        
7  See id. at 7. 
8  Id. at 5, 7.  
9  Id. at 8. 
10  See id. at 5–6. 
11  Id. at 43–44. 
12  Id. at 5. 
13  Id. at 7–8. 
14  Id. at 8–9. 
15  Id. at 10. 
16  See HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (1927), as reprinted in 
SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 859 (4th ed. 2009). 
17  Id. 
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nipresent in criminal court.18 The Progressives designed juvenile court “to ad-
minister justice in the name of truth, love, and understanding.”19 
As the Supreme Court explained:  
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and 
by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails 
with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society’s duty to 
the child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone. They believed 
that society’s role was not to ascertain whether the child was “guilty” or “inno-
cent,” but “What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be 
done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward 
career.”20 
During the oral argument, Justice Tom Clark asked Dorsen, “if [he wins], 
what would be left of juvenile court system?”21 Dorsen answered “the best 
part.”22 He meant, of course, the sentencing phase of juvenile justice. Dorsen’s 
answer was brilliant because it sealed his victory by letting the Justices know 
that juvenile court could survive whatever limits the Court might impose on 
how juvenile courts reached the sentencing phase. But his response could also 
be the subject of a long law review article. Recall that Gault was sentenced to a 
term of up to six years in the Arizona training school for an offense that the leg-
islature deemed worthy of a maximum sentence of two months of imprison-
ment for an adult. Actually, what happened to Gerald Gault is even worse than 
any of this thus far suggests. Not only was he denied a trial, Gault was denied a 
sentencing hearing, too. The Supreme Court described what happened after the 
juvenile court determined that Gault was guilty: 
At this June 15 hearing a “referral report” made by the probation officers 
was filed with the court, although not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. This 
listed the charge as “Lewd Phone Calls.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
judge committed Gerald as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School 
“for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by 
due process of law.” An order to that effect was entered. It recites that “after a 
full hearing and due deliberation the Court finds that said minor is a delinquent 
child, and that said minor is of the age of 15 years.”23 
The entire sentencing hearing took no more than a few minutes. The judge 
made no inquiry into Gault’s needs, nor into the strengths or deficiencies of his 
parents and family. The Court was disappointed, but left it at that. In Justice 
Fortas’s words:  
                                                        
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 
119–20 (1909)). 
21  Norman Dorsen, Forward to DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: 
PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE COURT, at xvii (1974). 
22  Id. 
23  Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–8. 
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[O]ne would assume that in a case like that of Gerald Gault, where the juvenile 
appears to have a home, a working mother and father, and an older brother, the 
Juvenile Judge would have made a careful inquiry and judgment as to the possi-
bility that the boy could be disciplined and dealt with at home, despite his previ-
ous transgressions.24 
Sadly, however, “except for some conversation with Gerald about his school 
work and his ‘wanting to go to . . . Grand Canyon with his father,’ the points to 
which the judge directed his attention were little different from those that 
would be involved in determining any charge of violation of a penal statute.”25 
In the state court proceedings, Gault’s lawyers argued “that it was error for 
the Juvenile Court to remove Gerald from the custody of his parents without a 
showing and finding of their unsuitability.”26 But Dorsen did not make this ar-
gument in the Supreme Court. 
It would be a fair question to pose to law students: which is worse? Being 
convicted of a crime without the right to remain silent, or being sentenced to 
loss of liberty thirty-six times longer than could have been imposed on an adult 
and without any meaningful inquiry into the need for the sentence? Many sure-
ly would conclude that the combination of unfettered power to deprive a guilty 
juvenile of liberty with the complete absence of a requirement to make mean-
ingful inquiry into the propriety or need for the sentence are, by far, the more 
serious shortcomings. As Emily Buss explains, “In finding Gerald Gault’s 
treatment unconstitutional, the Court neither challenged the substantive goals of 
the juvenile justice system nor argued for its abolition.”27 Rather, it meant to 
protect and advance the system’s distinct “substantive benefits,”28 insisting on-
ly that infusing adult procedural protections onto the adjudicative part of juve-
nile court was “compatible with the goals of the juvenile justice system and be-
cause these goals were not being achieved without these rights.”29 
Professor Buss explains that what should be unique about juvenile justice, 
would be requiring “a meaningful engagement between decisionmaker and 
child, an engagement that the child would experience as a conversation rather 
than as litigation, and that would communicate the concern and interest the 
state took in the child.”30 Professor Buss complains, “Gault reduced the analy-
sis of children’s due process rights to the simple-minded question of adult 
rights or no rights. And in the many cases considering accused juveniles’ due 
process rights since Gault, the Court has adhered to this narrow and nonsensi-
cal framing.”31 
                                                        
24  Id. at 28. 
25  Id. at 28–29. 
26  Id. at 10. 
27  Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 42 (2003). 
28  Gault, 387 U.S. at 21. 
29  Buss, supra note 27. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 43. 
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One of the more interesting features of the Gault decision is that, even 
though the record made no mention of the conditions of the placement facili-
ties, Justice Fortas chose to characterize them in ways that supported the 
Court’s decision to impose procedural protections on the trial phase of the pro-
ceedings.32 As Justice Fortas wrote: 
The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for 
years. It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical mean-
ing—that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. 
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a “receiving home” 
or an “industrial school” for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which 
the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes “a build-
ing with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . . .” In-
stead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, 
his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and “delinquents” 
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.33 
Professor Feld’s early work as a criminologist studying juvenile facilities 
in Massachusetts—a few years after Gault—fully corroborates the Court’s 
characterization. In Feld’s words,  
I lived in and studied the Massachusetts training schools for two years . . . visit-
ed training schools in several other states[] . . . [and] concluded that despite re-
habilitative rhetoric and modest efforts to provide treatment in institutions, these 
correctional facilities were custodial youth prisons whose primary virtue was 
that they were not as harmful or destructive as adult prisons and jails.34 
It’s nice, of course, to be candid about what juvenile justice was able to de-
liver. But did the Gault court imply that if the facilities to which young Gault 
had been sent were capable of treating and rehabilitating young offenders, that 
it would then be constitutionally acceptable to deprive Gerald of his liberty 
when he committed no act of wrongdoing? Was the Court really saying in 1967 
that it was because of the recognized failures of juvenile justice to help young 
people that the Constitution must constrain the procedures for adjudicating 
wrongdoing? That’s an awfully thin reed on which to stand a young person’s 
liberty interests. A more robust stance would make clear that even when the 
treatment features of juvenile justice worked exceedingly well, juveniles have a 
constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of their liberty without due 
process of law. Gault’s gratuitous criticism of the substance of juvenile justice 
undermined its focus on the liberty rights of children. And when the Burger 
Court replaced the Warren Court, it didn’t take very long for Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, to denigrate the liberty interests of children by explaining 
that children “are always in some form of custody.”35 
                                                        
32  Gault, 387 U.S. at 27. 
33  Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
34  Feld, supra note 1, at 305. 
35  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). 
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In all events, of the two parts of juvenile justice—the adjudicative and dis-
positional phases—Gault ignored the second entirely and purportedly radically 
changed the first by insisting that the rudiments of due process would be faith-
fully adhered to in all juvenile courts. Gault specifically held that there must be 
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the right to 
confront witnesses against them.36 Anyone with even the slightest familiarity 
with juvenile or criminal justice would immediately agree that, of all these 
rights, the right to counsel is paramount. If a young person appears in juvenile 
court without counsel, it will hardly matter whether he is given notice of the 
charges. His right to remain silent will functionally be rendered irrelevant along 
with his right to confront witnesses. Why is that so? Because without counsel, 
the juvenile is entirely ill-equipped to participate in the proceedings. Without 
counsel, the juvenile will almost certainly plead guilty to one or more of the 
charges. There won’t be a hearing; there won’t be witnesses; no defense will be 
raised. In other words, without counsel, juvenile proceedings would look little 
different than the proceeding conducted in Gerald Gault’s case. 
III.   THE “DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION” 
So, what happened in the years and decades after Gault? As Professor Feld 
explains, the majority of juvenile courts continued to function for decades after 
Gault was decided the same way they did for most of the century.37 Juvenile 
after juvenile appeared in court without counsel. One technical difference be-
tween the pre and post-Gault years is that before Gault, the concept of counsel 
was not even considered. After Gault, juvenile court judges persuaded juveniles 
and their families to waive their “right” to counsel and to proceed without legal 
representation. Professor Feld’s own work in the late 1980s showed that, in the 
jurisdictions he studied, a majority of juveniles went unrepresented in juvenile 
court.38 State courts also employed ingenious methods to assure that juveniles 
from poor families who were supposed to benefit from the constitutional right 
to free, court-assigned counsel never were assigned a lawyer. In Florida, for 
example, “indigency rules . . . were so strict that having $5 in the bank made a 
family ineligible for appointment counsel.”39 Moreover, as Wally Mlyniec ex-
                                                        
36  Gault, 367 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, and 57. 
37  See Feld, supra note 1, at 320. 
38  See Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Ju-
venile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 184–85 (1991); Feld, su-
pra note 4, at 907–08; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical 
Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1185 (1989); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR 
JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (1995) (documenting deficient representation in juvenile courts 
around the country). 
39  Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A Prom-
ise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 3, 2008, at 6 (citing PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN 
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plained, “Florida parents had to pay a $40 fee just to apply for an indigency de-
termination.”40 
Even worse than the juveniles who were never represented by lawyers, 
many who were represented got the wrong kind of lawyer—a lawyer who felt 
free to advocate for the outcome the lawyer believed was best for the client.41 
Ellen Marrus, writing as late as 2003 in defense of a strong client-centered ad-
vocacy model for accused delinquents, felt the need to characterize her views 
as “somewhat radical.”42 
The picture is not all bad on the legal representation front. Even if a ma-
jority of juveniles continued to appear in juvenile court unrepresented by coun-
sel, a cadre of juvenile defenders came onto the scene in the late 1960s in most 
major cities, including New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, District of 
Columbia, Los Angeles, among many others. These juvenile defenders repre-
sented their clients as well as public defenders represented indigent adult de-
fendants in criminal court. In these localities, the juvenile defenders fought 
hard for their juvenile clients, seeking to “win” cases whether or not their cli-
ents were factually guilty. But to say the picture was not all that bad risks plac-
ing the emphasis on the wrong accent. Gault changed practices in too few juve-
nile courts in the United States. In those fiefdoms that continued to look like 
the courts in the pre-Gault era, juvenile judges practiced in accordance with the 
proverbial judge’s insistence that “the Constitution doesn’t apply in my court-
room.” 
Thus far, the reader might reasonably wonder, was Gault really an im-
portant decision after all? Unquestionably, the answer is “yes.” Gault had a 
profound effect on the legal profession and law schools, as Professor Feld’s ca-
reer as a scholar and law teacher in juvenile justice attests, and it led to the 
teaching and study in law school of an entire new field—whether it was called 
juvenile justice or, more broadly, “children’s rights.” As much as anything, 
Gault marked the beginning of the modern Children’s Rights Movement.43 It 
also created a cadre of children’s lawyers (an even larger number of whom rep-
resent children in neglect and abuse proceedings than in delinquency cases), 
                                                                                                                                 
CRAWFORD, NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 33 (2006)).  
40  Id. 
41  See Elyce Zenoff Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of 
Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 384–85 (1971); Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role 
of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401, 
1410–11 (1973); Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical 
View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 326 
n.204 (2003) (reporting “[r]ecently” in 2003 that “students taking my Children’s Rights 
course at the University of Houston Law Center informed me that several attorneys had told 
them that they saw themselves more as guardian ad litems than as an attorney representing a 
client charged with a criminal offense.”). 
42  Marrus, supra note 41, at 360. 
43  See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 7–8 (2005). 
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resulting in the United States having more children’s lawyers than any country 
in the world.44 
But, limiting the subject to Gault’s impact on juvenile justice, what has 
been asserted thus far is that it had little impact on the way juvenile courts 
functioned in a majority of the United States. In those jurisdictions that contin-
ued to function without lawyers, Gault manifestly did not matter very much. 
And in the rest, where juvenile defenders appeared every day, the “junior 
court” status of juvenile court meant the disadvantages of practice that the Su-
preme Court allowed to survive the Gault revolution reduced the value of law-
yers. In particular, because few jurisdictions permit jury trials, and because the 
Court held that jury trials in juvenile court is not constitutionally required,45 
judges who sit as sole fact-finders in contested evidentiary hearings are permit-
ted to learn prejudicial information about the accused that, though technically 
inadmissible at trial, cannot be forgotten by the judge.46 As a result, these judg-
es are highly prone to convict even when the facts are manifestly insufficient 
when a rigorous reasonable doubt standard is applied.47 All of this, and more, 
led Barry Feld to conclude that juvenile court in the post-Gault world is “a 
scaled-down, second-class criminal court for young people.”48 
It is important to recall that Gault explicitly meant only to impact the adju-
dicative part of juvenile justice. It left untouched the dispositional part. This 
meant that into the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s, juveniles continued receiving sen-
tences considerably longer than adults could have received for the same infrac-
tions. It also meant that the conditions in the facilities to which juveniles were 
sent did not have to live up to their rehabilitative ideals. But, the cadre of juve-
nile lawyers that law schools started producing meant there was a new force to 
challenge conditions of confinement for sentenced delinquents. Many lawsuits 
were brought in the 1970s and ‘80s that secured federal rulings condemning 
various practices, such as placing juveniles into solitary confinement, hogtieing 
and physically abusing them, depriving them of food, imposing physical beat-
ings, administering psychotropic drugs solely to control behavior, and other sa-
distic practices that should never be inflicted on adults, no less children.49 
                                                        
44  Whether that, by itself, has helped children very much is also worthy of its own article. 
See generally Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 805 (2006). 
45  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
46  Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring 
the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 571–73 (1998). 
47  Id. at 564–65. 
48  Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 68. 
49  See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing routine beatings adminis-
tered by staff members); Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976) (citing solitary confinement, hogtieing, and administration of drugs for punishment); 
Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 170 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (finding that staff members rou-
tinely administered physical beatings, including blows to the face, and used tear gas); Lollis 
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citing soli-
tary confinement). 
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IV.   THE ‘GET-TOUGH’ YEARS 
As we have seen, Gault did not halt state practices of punishing children 
more severely than what is possible for adults. Indeed, the greatest change in 
juvenile justice in the last two decades of the twentieth century was the extent 
to which an ever-growing number of juveniles started receiving adult punish-
ments. 
This change was not the result of court decisions. Juveniles became eligible 
for adult sentences as a result of legislatures lowering the age of persons eligi-
ble for adult criminal court and sentences. As a result, juveniles who once had 
to be prosecuted in juvenile court were now either ineligible for juvenile court 
or, for the first time, eligible for adult criminal court. A mere eleven years after 
Gault was decided, the New York legislature amended its laws to make it pos-
sible to prosecute juveniles as young as thirteen in adult criminal court.50 Over 
the next two decades, every state followed New York’s lead, either by making 
it easier to transfer juveniles from juvenile to adult criminal court, or by initiat-
ing prosecutions in adult criminal court directly, thereby bypassing juvenile 
court entirely.51 
We can debate whether and to what extent Gault acted as a catalyst for the-
se changes. But the procedural revolution in the courthouse was dwarfed by the 
changes made at the legislative level throughout the United States. In the pre-
Gault era, juvenile judges had virtually unlimited discretion to deal with young 
offenders as they saw fit. By the mid-1990s, juvenile judges were considerably 
less involved in deciding whether to prosecute juveniles as juveniles and 
whether to sentence them as juveniles. Those decisions were largely turned 
over to prosecutors who were vested with the final authority to choose the level 
of charge to bring against a young person, as well as the court in which the 
matter would be handled.52 
A number of factors contributed to the changing sentencing schemes for 
juveniles beginning in the 1980s. Disappointment with juvenile justice came 
from the left and the right. Calls for shifting focus from the offender to the of-
fense, and for determinate instead of indeterminate sentences, were made by 
those who believed juvenile justice meted out too harsh sentences and those 
who believed it was too soft. Barry Feld was among the progressives who sup-
                                                        
50  Act of July 20, 1978, ch. 481, 1978 N.Y. Laws 11. 
51  See Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Reduce 
Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57, 60 (2013) 
(“[F]orty-seven states across the country passed various legislative measures in the 1990s 
designed to deter youth violence by enhancing criminal penalties on juvenile offenders. The-
se new laws took three primary forms: (1) forty-five states expanded juvenile eligibility for 
adult criminal court proceedings, (2) thirty states expanded sentencing authority in juvenile 
cases, and (3) forty-seven states removed traditional confidentiality provisions by making 
previously sealed juvenile records more open to public scrutiny.”). 
52  See Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly Revi-
sionist History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2010) (arguing that this transfer of power 
has been a leading characteristic of juvenile justice reform over the past twenty-five years). 
17 NEV.L.J. 371, GUGGENHEIM - FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:05 AM 
Spring 2017] JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMER 381 
ported these changes.53 One of the principal goals Professor Feld hoped to 
achieve by shifting attention away from the offender to the offense, and by lim-
iting a judge’s discretion when imposing punishment, was to reduce racial dis-
parity in the severity of punishment. But Feld never anticipated how harsh the 
sentencing laws would become after the moral panic caused by “super preda-
tor” rhetoric.54 
Perhaps above all else, Professor Feld has been a trenchant critic of racism 
in our criminal and juvenile justice systems.55 His proposed method of mitigat-
ing, if not eliminating, racial disparity in sentencing in the 1980s was reminis-
cent of the support for the federal sentencing guidelines in the same period.56 
That experiment didn’t work out any better than it did for juveniles. We now 
live in an era of mass incarceration and of prisons disproportionately filled with 
people of color.57 
Recall that Gault did not constrain the legislative choice to sentence juve-
niles to indeterminate sentences unrelated to the severity of the crime that 
brought them before the court. Although Gault’s lawyer chose not to raise the 
issue, a sound legal argument against imposing grossly higher punishments on 
children than may be imposed on adults can be framed on constitutional 
grounds. But what arguments can be made when states choose merely to sub-
ject children to the same punishment that states impose on adults? Whatever 
those arguments may be, won’t they need to come close to arguing that states 
must maintain a juvenile justice system, at least in the sense that states must 
treat children differently than adults? This is an extremely important point. No 
one in the long history of juvenile justice through the end of the twentieth cen-
tury took seriously the idea that states are obliged to treat children differently 
than adults. Rather, juvenile justice, the Progressives’ invention, was widely 
understood to be grounded in sound social policy. A policy that wise legislators 
should want to support, not one they were required to have. 
                                                        
53  See, e.g., Feld, supra note 4. 
54  John DiLulio is responsible for the term “super-predator” which meant to characterize 
remorseless adolescents involved in murder, rape, and drugs. John J. DiLulio Jr., The Com-
ing of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23, http://www.weekly 
standard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160 [https://perma.cc/PY76-
LY7Y].  
55  See BAD KIDS, supra note 3. 
56  Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress established the United States Sen-
tencing Commission and charged it with the task of designing a sentencing structure that 
would avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who 
ha[d] been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .” Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat. 1837, 2018 (1984) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1)(B)); see Matthew C. Lamb, A Return to Rehabilitation: Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 41 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 126, 126–27 (2014) 
(“Mandatory minimum sentencing promised an egalitarian form of sentencing by requiring 
judges to impose a mandatory sentence regardless of race or class.”). 
57  See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
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With this understanding, the critical question many wondered in the early 
days after Gault was how much more would the Supreme Court interfere with 
the way states chose to run their juvenile courts before legislators would rebel 
and abandon the effort. This fear was articulated very clearly in Justice 
Blackmun’s plurality opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, which ended with 
this sentiment: “If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be 
superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate 
existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the 
moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.”58 
Thus, it appeared unlikely that courts would find anything unconstitutional 
about the country’s universal trend to shrink the number of juveniles served by 
the juvenile justice system. Two substantial barriers seemed to prevent courts 
from striking down legislative judgments that juveniles ought to be punished 
the same as adults. Most significantly, the Court has long accorded great defer-
ence to states to define what sentences are appropriate for criminals. Based on 
principles of federalism and the separation of powers, federal courts are con-
strained from “intrud[ing] upon the administration of justice by the individual 
States.”59 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan aptly 
summarizes the principle: “[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial def-
erence to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determin-
ing the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”60 In addition to this very 
substantial barrier, forbidding states from punishing children indistinguishably 
from adults comes very close to requiring states to maintain a juvenile justice 
system, something that not very long ago seemed preposterous. 
By the end of the twentieth century, juvenile justice was in shambles. As a 
result of legislative changes in every state, prosecutors now held the power to 
decide whom to punish as adults. By 2005, that meant that as many as 250,000 
juveniles were being tried, sentenced, and incarcerated as adults throughout the 
United States each year.61 And, of course, giving this amount of discretion to 
                                                        
58  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“My hope is that today’s decision will not spell 
the end of a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment intended to mitigate 
the rigors and trauma of exposing youthful offenders to a traditional criminal court; each step 
we take turns the clock back to the pre-juvenile-court era. I cannot regard it as a manifesta-
tion of progress to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what we are well 
on the way to accomplishing. We can only hope the legislative response will not reflect our 
own by having these courts abolished.”). 
59  See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)); see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (“[T]he 
authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative . . . [and] the right to re-
lieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it pro-
vided, belongs to the executive department.”). 
60  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 
61  NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., STATE TRENDS—LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES 
FROM 2005 TO 2010: REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 
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local prosecutors virtually guaranteed that children from poor families of color 
would be the most likely to get the book thrown at them.62 
V.   TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BREAKTHROUGHS 
In My Life in Crime, Professor Feld divides juvenile justice into three eras 
– the Due Process era, the Get Tough era, and “the contemporary reaffirmation 
that Kids are Different.”63 I have thus far briefly discussed the first two. I trust 
the reader will agree that recounting them doesn’t offer much enthusiasm for 
using law to improve the conditions of disempowered people. The good news is 
that the contemporary era contains lots of very good news for those who are 
disappointed with most of what happened to juvenile justice in the United 
States over the past fifty years. 
The current era began with the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, Roper v. 
Simmons, which forbids executing someone for a crime committed before the 
person was eighteen years old.64 In 2010, the Court extended this ruling in 
Graham v. Florida, by forbidding states from sentencing all juveniles to life 
without parole for non-homicide offenses.65 Rounding out this trilogy, the 
Court’s decision in the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama prohibited mandatory life 
without parole sentences of all persons who commit any crime while under the 
age of eighteen.66 
These three great cases, which combined rank as perhaps the most im-
portant juvenile justice cases ever decided, stand for a constitutional principle 
few knew existed only a few short years ago: juveniles may not be punished as 
if they are adults, even when they’ve committed the most heinous of crimes. 
Sandwiched between them, in 2011 the court also decided J.D.B. v. North Car-
olina, which also broke ground once thought impregnable, ruling that the Con-
stitution requires special rules applicable to children when they are interrogated 
by police.67 These four cases lay the groundwork for the next generation of ju-
venile advocates to insist that juveniles be given discounts and special protec-
tions because they are different from adults in ways that legislatures and courts 
have a duty to recognize. 
Barry Feld spent much of his career making such arguments, as he has 
shown in My Life in Crime. If I went too far in my earlier discussion suggesting 
                                                                                                                                 
(2011), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BN68-4U9L]. 
62  See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 
CRIME & JUST. 81, 100–04, 110–11 (2000); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juve-
nile Court—Part II: Race and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 
329–31, 358 (1999). 
63  Feld, supra note 1, at 302. 
64  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
65  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
66  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
67  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 281 (2011). 
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how miserable the first two eras of juvenile justice have been in the years fol-
lowing Gault, I meant especially to contrast them with the current era, which is 
full of brightness and hope. Virtually from the beginning of his career, Feld has 
argued that children deserve a discount for their youth when it comes to punish-
ing them for misbehavior, and they require special procedures designed to en-
sure that their rights are respected and protected against overreaching by state 
officials.68 In his words, juveniles deserve “substantive justice,” which “re-
quires a rationale to sentence younger offenders differently, and more leniently, 
than older defendants, a formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating fac-
tor in sentencing.”69 That is precisely what Miller now requires as a constitu-
tional principle.70 And, Feld has long advocated for “procedural justice” which 
“requires providing youths with full procedural parity with adult defendants 
and additional safeguards to account for the disadvantages of youth in the jus-
tice system.”71 This is quite close to what J.D.B. says,72 and we can look for-
ward to the Court building on that case through the work of Professor Feld. 
How wonderful that, as he retires after a brilliant career, he can look back on it 
as filled with true meaning because, at last, the Supreme Court heard and 
agreed with him. 
VI.   THE REAL LEGACY OF THE WARREN COURT’S CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE REVOLUTION 
Law professors with expertise in juvenile justice are at risk of suffering 
from two closely related phenomena. First, they may pay too much attention to 
what the Supreme Court says, at the expense of carefully monitoring how the 
system operates on the lives of young people. Second, they may pay far closer 
attention to the workings of juvenile court than they do to the workings of crim-
inal court. That can lead to the conclusion that juvenile court is so flawed that it 
needs to be abandoned. The call for abandonment is based on a grass-is-greener 
mentality. Knowing just how bad things are in my world, they surely must be 
better elsewhere. 
Barry Feld never made the first mistake. Throughout his long career, he has 
been a realist who looked carefully at the wider picture of juvenile justice in 
which legislatures, the police, and prosecutors play an outsized role in how ju-
venile justice actually works. Not only did he pay careful attention to these 
non-court actors, he advised legislators and proposed legislation intended to 
improve juvenile justice. But Feld very likely fell prone to the second error. He 
got to know juvenile court exceptionally well. But he did not study nearly as 
carefully the goings-on in criminal court. The more he saw and knew about ju-
                                                        
68  See Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3. 
69  Id. at 97 (emphasis omitted). 
70  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
71  Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 97. 
72  J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 281. 
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venile court, the less he liked the system to which he devoted his life’s work. 
But he was naïve in imagining that things were sufficiently rosier in criminal 
court that it made good sense to send all juveniles there. He simply assumed 
that professionals responsible for the operation of criminal court would not 
have permitted criminal court to descend to the depths he saw from his study of 
juvenile court. 
Twenty years ago, the late Bill Stuntz brilliantly brought to life just how 
limited the powers of the Supreme Court really are when it comes to insisting 
upon a fundamentally fair process for criminal justice.73 In The Uneasy Rela-
tionship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, Stuntz made plain 
that most students of the law falsely believe that the Supreme Court gets to set 
the rules of procedure.74 “Most talk about the law of criminal procedure,” he 
wrote, “treats that law as a self-contained universe.”75 The reasoning for most 
people is straightforward: 
The Supreme Court says that suspects and defendants have a right to be free 
from certain types of police or prosecutorial behavior. Police and prosecutors, 
for the most part, then do as they’re told. When they don’t, and when the mis-
conduct is tied to criminal convictions, the courts reverse the convictions, there-
by sending a message to misbehaving officials.76 
But Stuntz responded:  
The picture is, of course, wrong. Criminal procedure’s rules and remedies 
are embedded in a larger system, a system that can adjust to those rules in ways 
other than obeying them. And the rules can in turn respond to the system in a va-
riety of ways, not all of them pleasant.77 
Thus it was that the criminal process revolution wrought by the Warren Court 
ended up leading to the opposite of what almost everyone expected, undoubted-
ly including the Justices who participated in the revolution. Instead of fairer tri-
als resulting from expanded confrontational rights,78 opportunities to challenge 
dubious confessions79 and eyewitness identifications,80 not to mention the all-
important right to a court-assigned lawyer81 and a jury trial,82 we ended up with 
practically no trials at all.83 Instead of more acquittals, we ended up with virtu-
                                                        
73  See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
nal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). 
74  See id. at 3–4. 
75  Id. at 3. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 3–4. 
78  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965). 
79  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1964). 
80  Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). 
81  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). 
82  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
83  Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-
is-served-behind-closed-doors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TAJ9-DZUK] (noting that New 
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ally no acquittals. Instead of fewer people losing their liberty, we ended up with 
mass incarceration.84 
How could this have happened? Very easily, it turned out. As Stuntz ex-
plained it: 
As courts have raised the cost of criminal investigation and prosecution, legisla-
tures have sought out devices to reduce those costs. Severe limits on defense 
funding are the most obvious example, but not the only one. Expanded criminal 
liability makes it easier for the government to induce guilty pleas, as do high 
mandatory sentences that serve as useful threats against recalcitrant defendants. 
And guilty pleas avoid most of the potentially costly requirements that criminal 
procedure imposes. These strategies would no doubt be politically attractive an-
yway, but the law of criminal procedure makes them more so. Predictably, un-
derfunding, overcriminalization, and oversentencing have increased as criminal 
procedure has expanded.85 
The legislative branch was responsible for most of these changes. By sub-
stantially increasing the budgets of law enforcement, adding new crimes to the 
books, and increasing the penalties for felony convictions, legislatures ended up 
with considerably more power than the Supreme Court in reshaping criminal 
justice and, even more remarkably, constitutional criminal procedure (some-
thing many thought belonged to the exclusive province of the Supreme Court). 
Add to that the maximum terms of imprisonment defendants risk when daring 
to challenge the charges in court and the consequence of ever increasing maxi-
mum sentences assigned for convictions, and the system was brilliantly re-
framed from one that provides defendants with an opportunity to test the gov-
ernment’s case, to one in which all that is done is negotiating the length of 
punishment that courts will impose.86 
The executive branch also contributed more than its share to rendering 
iconic Supreme Court decisions virtually irrelevant. Local police decisions to 
employ a broken windows campaign meant that an unprecedented number of 
poor people were stopped and frisked by the police, creating the highest level 
                                                                                                                                 
York Southern District Federal District Court Judge Jesse Furman has presided over one 
criminal trial in his more than four years on the bench). Trials are a rarity in federal and most 
state criminal courts today. See, e.g., SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN 
NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVICES 142 (2006) (finding more than 319,000 cases were filed in New York 
City’s Criminal Court in 2004, and there were a total of 727 trials altogether (280 by jury 
and 447 by bench)).  
84  See Laura Cohen, When the Law is Guilty: Confronting the Mass Incarceration Crisis in 
the United States, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 841, 842 (2014) (“At the end of 2012, 2.2 million 
people were doing time in adult prisons or jails throughout the United States.”) (citing 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NATION BEHIND BARS: A HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION 5 (2014)). 
85  Stuntz, supra note 73, at 4. 
86  97 percent of federal criminal defendants waive all trial rights and plead guilty. United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also Stephen 
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2008 (1992) (stating that 90 
percent of cases are resolved by guilty pleas). 
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of court filings in American history.87 Along with an astonishing rise in state 
court felony filings (more than doubling between 1978 and 1990, for exam-
ple),88 came an even larger growth ratio of cases handled by assigned defense 
lawyers, with many public defenders expected to represent between two and 
four hundred clients at a time.89 As a consequence, innocent defendants ended 
up worse off than before the criminal procedure revolution. 
This is the sad fate of the Warren Court criminal procedure victories. No 
doubt this fate was aided by the rightward turn of the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts, particularly in their refusal to take seriously the responsibility of courts 
to ensure that a defendant is able to secure effective legal representation.90 The 
bottom line is inarguable: more than forty-five years after the Warren Court 
revolution, it is impossible to brag about the fairness of America’s criminal jus-
tice system as it impacts the fate of people unable to purchase private legal rep-
resentation.91 Stuntz’s analysis turns popular belief on its head: “Ever since the 
1960s,” he wrote, “the right has argued that criminal procedure frees too many 
of the guilty. The better criticism may be that it helps to imprison too many of 
the innocent.”92 
Going further, Stuntz explained that much of the Warren Court’s impetus 
for constitutionalizing criminal procedure and imposing meaningful restraint on 
local actors in the criminal justice system was to mitigate or eliminate racial 
discrimination.93 The Warren Court used the incorporation clause of the Four-
                                                        
87  See generally K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of 
Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009); 
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/ 
broken-windows/304465/?single_page=true [https://perma.cc/S83E-BQBK]. 
88  Stuntz, supra note 73, at 9. 
89  See David A. Simon, Equal Before the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon’s Promise, 
43 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES. L. REV. 581, 590 (2008) (stating that one public defend-
er in Minnesota resigned from his job after being obliged in the previous year to handle a 
caseload of 135 felony cases, 53 gross misdemeanors, 343 misdemeanors, 136 probation vio-
lations, and 60 miscellaneous cases); see also Martin Guggenheim, The People’s Right to a 
Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 404 (2012) 
(describing one county in New York in the early 2000s in which each public defender had an 
average caseload of 1,000 misdemeanor and 175 felony cases per attorney per year). 
90  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700–01 (1984). As Gary Goodpaster wrote, 
Strickland “appears primarily designed to help reviewing courts deal efficiently with these 
claims rather than seriously address the potential injustice problems caused by incompetent 
trial counsel.” Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance 
of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 67 (1986). 
91  A report by the American Bar Association in 2004 concluded that “thousands of persons 
are processed through America’s courts every year either with no lawyer at all or with a law-
yer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effec-
tive representation.” AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE, at iv (2004). 
92  Stuntz, supra note 73, at 5. 
93  Id. 
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teenth Amendment to constrain local actors from unfairly depriving poor black 
men of their liberty.94 Here, again, the Court overestimated its capacity and un-
derestimated the ingenuity of other actors in the criminal justice system. In 
Stuntz’s words, “defendants’ rights address only one form of discrimination, 
and it is probably the least important form that the system engages in.”95 The 
enormous discretion accorded the legislature to set the limits of sentences, to 
authorize mandatory minimum sentences, and to add new crimes to the books, 
combined with the even broader discretion accorded to the police and prosecu-
tors to determine who to arrest, what to charge, and what sentence to seek, 
overwhelm most of what the Court was able to accomplish.96 As Stuntz put it, 
“[i]f one is looking for race discrimination in the administration of criminal jus-
tice, these are the places to find it. And the law of criminal procedure has al-
most nothing to say about them.”97 
What’s important about this history as it applies to adults is how well it 
tracks the history of juvenile justice, too. Franklin Zimring has long insisted 
that students of juvenile justice in the United States in the last three decades of 
the twentieth century are looking in the wrong place if they study what the Su-
preme Court has done.98 Like Stuntz, Zimring insists that the real story of juve-
nile justice practice over the past fifty years was written by legislators, the po-
lice, and the prosecutors. Indeed, Zimring explains that, of all the professional 
actors who lost authority in the post-Gault world, judges stand out the most.99 
Once legislators lowered the age of criminal responsibility, changed the rules 
by which persons under eighteen could be prosecuted as adults, and substantial-
ly increased the penalties once they were convicted, the result was sure to be-
come an unprecedented high rate of incarceration for young people. And once 
schools enforced zero tolerance policies, shunting young people to criminal 
court for acts that a generation earlier were handled outside of courts, more 
young people than ever before in American history were arrested and prosecut-
ed as criminals.100 
Some may criticize Gault for theoretically making it too difficult to adjudi-
cate guilty delinquents because they are entitled to crafty defense lawyers to 
help them win on technicalities, but the post-Gault world bears few of these 
                                                        
94  See Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. 
REV. 59, 67 (2010). 
95  Stuntz, supra note 73, at 50. 
96  See id at 50–51. 
97  Id. at 51. 
98  See Franklin E. Zimring, Levels of Government, Branches of Government, and the Reform 
of Juvenile Justice, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (“[S]tate and local government has al-
ways been, and will always remain, the main arena of juvenile justice policy in the United 
States.”). 
99  See Zimring, supra note 52, at 3–4. 
100  See CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, CRADLE TO PRISON PIPELINE FACT SHEET (2009), 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/cradle-to-prison-pipeline-overview-fact-sheet-
2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB49-3BG4]. 
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hallmarks. The scheme was rigged by actors that proved to be more important 
than the Court, creating an arrangement in which very few trials would ever 
take place; an ever-growing number of young people would be charged and 
prosecuted in adult criminal court (in which few trials would ever take place); 
and an all-time high number of young people would serve adult-like sentences 
in adult prisons, on a scale unimaginable a generation earlier.101 
There always will be limits to what we can expect from courts when it 
comes to protecting the rights of the accused, regardless of their age. That said, 
Professor Stuntz identified an important role courts might begin undertaking 
that would provide at least some relief. To rein in state power and vindicate the 
rights of poor people accused of crime, Stuntz argued that courts must become 
involved substantively with the law of sentencing, and find a way to prevent 
over-sentencing and the needless deprivation of liberty.102 This is precisely 
what has come to pass in juvenile justice through the Supreme Court’s trilogy 
decisions in Roper, Graham, and particularly Miller. The Court’s extension of 
regulating the sentencing of juveniles, even outside of the death penalty, opens 
hope for the future; a future both Professor Feld and I hope will be brighter 
than the first fifty years after Gault has been. Nonetheless, even if the Supreme 
Court were to be filled with nine Justice Sotomayors, the plight of poor black 
adolescents would nonetheless still remain in the hands of legislatures, the po-
lice, and prosecutors (along with school administrators, foster care officials, 
and other low level bureaucrats) to a much greater degree than anything the 
Court has to say about the matter. 
VII.  BARRY FELD 2.0 
Perhaps the most remarkable part of what Professor Feld has written in My 
Life in Crime might be missed by someone who hasn’t been around for as long 
as he and I have. During this long journey of trying to reform juvenile justice 
and to treat young offenders well, there were two camps of juvenile advocates. 
The main camp, of which I was a part, pressed to maintain a separate juvenile 
court. We found it challenging at times to insist that juvenile court survive, as 
even we disliked so much about it.103 A small number of stout advocates, led by 
Professor Feld, disagreed. They (he) argued that the best thing we could do is 
blow up juvenile court and leave it in the ashes of history as a failed Progres-
sive experiment. 
Here’s vintage Barry Feld writing in 1997 as the strong defender of juve-
nile rights he has always been. Because juvenile court, he wrote, “provides 
                                                        
101  See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. 
L. REV. 99, 108 (2010) (finding that “an estimated 200,000 youth are prosecuted, sentenced, 
or incarcerated as adults across the United States”). 
102  Stuntz, supra note 73, at 66.  
103  See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juve-
nile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 174 n.66 (1993). 
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young offenders with neither therapy nor justice,” and because juveniles de-
serve all of the procedural protections afforded adults by the criminal justice 
system, “[n]o compelling reasons exist to maintain separate from an adult crim-
inal court, a punitive juvenile court whose only remaining distinctions are its 
persisting procedural deficiencies.”104 Feld had trouble identifying sound argu-
ments for continuing the Progressive experiment. To those who objected that 
criminal courts are well known to have high caseloads, ineffective lawyers, and 
assembly-line justice,105 Feld’s response was “these shortcomings equally char-
acterize juvenile courts as well.”106 Feld’s conclusion was that, by the 1980s, 
“few juvenile court proponents even attempt any longer to defend the institu-
tion on its own merits, but only to justify it by comparison with criminal courts, 
which they contend are worse.”107 
Feld has long put his finger on the heart of the juvenile justice puzzle. His 
call for the abolition of a separate juvenile court stemmed from several separate 
considerations. A staunch advocate for equal procedural justice for children, 
Feld straightforwardly believed that the best system designed to protect the 
rights of adults should be employed for children, too. This diminishes the risk 
that children will be parties to a second-class justice system; something observ-
ers of juvenile court have long claimed to be the case. Feld found that juvenile 
“judges impose haphazard, unequal, and discriminatory punishment on similar-
ly situated offenders without any effective procedural or appellate checks.”108 
And, he insisted that “[a]s long as the mythology prevails that juvenile court 
intervention constitutes only benign coercion and that . . . children should not 
expect more, youths will continue to receive the ‘worst of both worlds.’ ”109 In 
the 1990s, Feld characterized juvenile court as conception: “Combining social 
welfare and penal social control[s],” Feld explained, “only ensures that the 
court performs both functions badly.”110 An unsparing, clear eyed observer of 
juvenile justice in the United States, Professor Feld wrote in 1999 that “[m]ost 
people tolerate an intolerable juvenile justice [system] because they believe that 
it will affect only other people’s children—children of other colors, classes, and 
cultures—and not their own.”111 
For more than two decades, Feld called for the abolition of juvenile court, 
believing that young people would be treated more fairly in a court that plays 
by the same rules used for adult defendants while also maintaining a commit-
                                                        
104  Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 68–69. 
105  See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 103, at 173; H. Ted Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court? 
Legislative Developments, Reform Directions, and the Call for Abolition, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 281, 296 (1979). 
106  Abolish the Juvenile Court, supra note 3, at 96. 
107  Id. 
108  BAD KIDS, supra note 3, at 293. 
109  Id. at 294 (citation omitted). 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 330. 
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ment to recognize that children are less blameworthy than adults, thus ensuring 
that they would be treated like kids when it came to sentencing. Now he no 
longer is so sure. He now appreciates that the politics of crime and race in the 
United States could not produce the type of social welfare or justice systems 
that are required to protect children from gross injustices.112 
Channeling Stuntz, I want to take this a step further. Instead of the shibbo-
leth that juvenile court is inferior to the real criminal court, invariably cutting 
corners and denying the accused procedural justice, it turns out that in many 
cities in the United States, it’s the last remaining criminal trial court that actual-
ly conducts trials. What other court remains in the United States that doesn’t 
tax an accused by adding ten to sixty years in prison for insisting on taking a 
case to trial? There are many clinics taught in law schools today that chose ju-
venile court as the venue for teaching students trial skills because trials actually 
occur there. There is no denying that juvenile court has built-in features that 
render it less fair than an ideal system, such as the absence of jury trials and the 
common practice of judges presiding over trials in which they have learned 
highly prejudicial, technically inadmissible facts that virtually eliminate the op-
portunity for the accused to be tried before a neutral trier of fact. But at least 
they have trials. 
So, at the end of his career, Feld has capitulated in a remarkable way. What 
he writes in 2016 is opposite from his views twenty years earlier. He has re-
joined the corps of juvenile advocates who always feared the excesses of crimi-
nal court. Feld now believes “simply deflecting youths from the criminal justice 
system avoids its more destructive consequences and shields them from life-
altering punishment and collateral consequences.”113 I think he could go further 
and concede, “maybe, just maybe, it’s not as unfair by comparison as I once 
thought.” But, either way, welcome back, Barry. 
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113  Feld, supra note 1, at 329. 
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